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Abstract. Approaches to the safety analysis of software-intensive sys-
tems are being adapted to also provide security assurance. Extensions
have been proposed to reflect the specific nature of security analysis by
introducing intention as a causal factor to reaching unsafe state of the
system, or by introducing new layers in the system modelling to model
its surface of attack.
In this paper we propose to extend these approaches by modelling the
attacks perspective alongside the system. We explain how such modelling
could be used to verify the coverage of the security analysis and facilitate
its maintenance.
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1 Introduction
The ubiquitous computing paradigm is prevalent in nowadays systems which
leaves them vulnerable to faults [5]. Safety analysis is essential for safety-critical
systems as it identifies the behaviour and properties that each component and
the system as a whole need to satisfy. The security of computer systems is of
growing concern and requires such analysis to consider external threat as well as
hazard in system design, development and operation. The combination of system
safety and security using advanced engineering techniques along with detailed
knowledge of domains and processes has made the task extremely challenging
for cyber-security professionals.
In this paper, we explore security analysis approaches inspired by safety
hazard analysis methods. We then present an extension to these approaches
to model the attack perspectives alongside the system and discuss how this
modelling could increase the security analysis by focusing on the attacker’s point
of view, and could help in verifying the coverage of the security analysis and
facilitate the maintenance of the analysis.
2 Safety and Security Analysis
In this section, we explore a selection of works that adapt, for security, hazard
analysis methodologies developed for safety. In particular, we are looking at
the base on which the analysis is built, the manner individual elements of the
analysis differ, and how the coverage of the analysis is sought with the perspective
of constructing a safety or security assurance case. A summary is presented in
Table 1 of Section 2.3.
These safety analysis methodologies are Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA)
and Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [6], part of Systems-Theoretic
Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) [5]. For a more exhaustive survey
of approaches combining safety and security analysis, see [4].
2.1 Safety Analysis
FHA. Safety analysis implies a combined systematic inspection of the system’s
functional specification and the conditions that could trigger hazards the sys-
tem should avoid. FHA suggests a methodology to conduct such analysis by
putting together a bottom-up and a to-down approaches. The bottom-up ap-
proach, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), exhaustively explores the
ways each component of the system could fail, and the cause and safety impli-
cation of the failure. At the base of this elicitation of single point of failures are
the system’s components and specification. It is complemented by the top-down
approach, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), which structures the analysis of more
complex scenarios that could lead to a hazard. Hazards are at the root of this
tree-based analysis which explores the conditions which could trigger the hazard
to occur, the conditions could be a combination of failures and events.
STPA. Due to the ever increasing complexity of systems, such systematic ex-
ploration starting from the system’s architecture or from the hazards to avoid
is costly to implement and maintain, and does not handle well systems with
complex interactions. As part of STAMP [5] which is a more holistic approach
to modelling accident causality, the hazard analysis STPA [6] was proposed as
an alternative method based on a system abstraction in terms of controller and
actuators. This approach allows to better model the system-wide interactions.
STPA shifts the safety focus from failure to control. It regards hazard as result-
ing from a lack of enforcement of safety constraints rather than resulting from
from component failure. This focus is more relevant for software-intensive sys-
tems as software components do not fail the same way physical component fail.
The goal is to control the behaviour of the components and systems as a whole
to ensure that safety constraints are enforced in the operational system.
Safety constraints are enumerated by mapping hazards to the system’s con-
trol actions. Accident scenarios are then derived from these constraints by look-
ing at control factors and control flaws.
2.2 Safety Analysis Methods Adapted for Security Analysis
STAMP and STPA were presented as system-centric analysis, [10, 11, 1] suggests
with STPA-Sec that this approach could be applied for security analysis simply
by adapting its safety terminology to the security equivalent. STPA-Sec proposes
a change to the traditional bottom-up approach of security analysis where threats
are used to derive security requirements. A number of works [8, 2] have then
highlighted the limitations of this safety-oriented view and proposed ways to
effectively extend STPA to match the peculiarities of security analysis. In the
following we explore how safety approaches have been extended to allow for
security analysis.
Threat Model Based on Intention. In [8], the authors suggest that security
threats could not simply be viewed as equivalent to a list of safety hazards but
that the intention, which is at the heart of a security attack, must be modelled.
This follows previous work in [7] by the authors to adapt the FMEA safety
method for security by including vulnerabilities, threat agent and threat mode in
the failure elicitation. They named their approach Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities
and Effects Analysis (FMVEA). For a security-critical analysis, four ingredients
(vulnerabilities, threat agent, threat mode, threat effect) are proposed and from
which an attack probability is derived.
Similarly, an approach to extend FTA with attacker’s intention has been
proposed in [9]. Security events are added to the fault tree with a likelihood level.
Note that this probability level is to change over time depending on availability
of attack capabilities.
Surface of Attack. In [2], STPA-SafeSec is proposed as another extension
of STPA for combined safety and security analysis. The authors suggest that
the security analysis needs to be performed on the components of the system
rather than the controllers as it is done in STPA. This choices allows to base the
security constraints on the system physical vulnerabilities, effectively modeling
the surface of attack of the system. Methods similar to STPA are then used
to derive the security constraints and attack scenarios. In STPA-SafeSec, both
safety constraints and security constraints are derived.
2.3 Base, Elements and Coverage of Analysis
Table 1 summaries the analysis strategies we discussed in this paper in terms of
their strategy and coverage. The coverage should be seen as central for building
a security assurance case from the analysis.
3 Attack Capabilities for Security Analysis
We outline in this section our proposition to extend the approaches discussed in
Section 2. This extension has three main features: adding dependencies to the
attack surface, modelling threats from the attacker’s perspective, verifying the
coherence between attack models and attack dependencies. We finally enumerate
the changes to the STPA-SafeSec analysis process these features imply.
Table 1. Strategy and assurance of analysis methodologies
This table gives an overview of the strategy each analysis methodology from Section 2
implies and the assurance it provides in terms of its coverage.
Approach
S
a
fe
ty
S
ec
u
ri
ty
Base for the analysis Differentiation
criteria for analysis
elements
How coverage of the
analysis could be
achieved
FMEA 5 Components Cause and effect Enumeration of
failure modes
FMVEA 5 Components Vulnerability, threat,
attack type
Enumeration of
threat modes
FTA 5 Hazards Accident scenario Decomposition of
hazard causes
STPA 5 Control actions Accident scenario
(control factors and
flaws)
Enumeration of four
types of unsafe
control action
STPA-Sec 5 5 Control actions Hazard scenario Enumeration of four
types of unsafe
control action
STPA-SafeSec 5 Components Hazard scenario Enumeration of
attack modes per
security concern
5 Control actions Hazard scenario Enumeration of
unsafe control action
3.1 Extend Attack Surface with Vulnerability Dependencies
STPA-SafeSec introduces on top of STPA’s control layer a component layer.
Each type of component of this layer is paired with generic security constraints
(or vulnerabilities) to effectively map the physical surface of attack of the system.
This surface of attack is an essential base for the security analysis, we propose
to extend it with vulnerability dependencies to identify the combinations of
vulnerabilities that may result in the system being compromised. A dependency
between a vulnerability v1 and a vulnerability v2 indicates that if v1 is exploited
it makes v2 more open to subsequent exploits. These dependencies are expressed
at the component and control layer of the system to refine the physical and
control interactions of the system.
3.2 Model Attack alongside System
FMVEA and the extension of STPA-Sec suggested in [8] propose to replace
safety-oriented failures with security-oriented threats to represent intentions in
a security analysis.
We propose to go one step further in representing the intention by mod-
elling attackers and attacks alongside the modelling of the system. An attack
agent represents an attacker entity, and an attack mode represent an individual
attack a method to exploit a vulnerability (these are respectively equivelent to
FMVEA’s threat agent and threat mode). An attack gain represents the outcome
of an attack from the agent’s point of view, this differs from FMVEA’s threat
effect which is expressed in terms similar to a failure effect in safety and there-
fore is from the system perspective. Finally, an attack strategy is represented
as an attack tree [3]. An attack strategy is attached to an agent with an attack
gain objective. Individual attack scenarios within a strategy are combined with
or nodes and comprise attack modes exploiting components which are combined
with with and nodes. Each individual attack scenario is evaluated by means of
attack impact which is its hazard effect on the system.
3.3 Verification and Coverage of Analysis
The separation between the system and the attacks’ point of view make it possi-
ble to perform some automated verification of coherence and coverage of the anal-
ysis. The correspondence between attack modes and vulnerabilities could help
to validate the vulnerability dependencies and the attack strategies as Table 2
explains. Dependencies and strategies should strengthen the maintainability of
the analysis by highlighting the impact a new vulnerability or attack mode.
Table 2. Correspondence, verification, coverage between system and attack elements
System Mapping and Analysis Attack
Vulnerability Mapping indicating that an attack vector
could exploit a given vulnerability
Attack mode
Vulnerability dependency Individual attack scenario make use of a
combination of attack modes on
components, these combinations must
correspond to vulnerability dependencies,
every vulnerability dependency must be
illustrated in attack scenarios
Attack strategy
3.4 Analysis Process
The extensions we suggest requires additional steps within the STPA-SafeSec [2]
analysis process. These additional steps are indicated in Table 3.
4 Conclusion
We proposed in this paper to model attacks alongside the system to better cap-
ture the intention of the attacker and the attack vectors when deriving scenarios.
This approach which extends previous works offers opportunities to verify the
analysis and its coverage.
Table 3. Extension to STPA-SafeSec’s analysis process
Note that we use the term vulnerability in place of STPA-SafeSec’s security constraint
STPA-SafeSec process Additional analysis step
High level analysis 1 Derive vulnerabilities
2 Define attack modes
3 Map attack modes to vulnerabilities
4 Define attack profiles (agents, gains)
Control loop analysis 1 Define vulnerability dependencies
2 Identify attack scenarios
3 Verify coherence between attack scenarios and vulnerability
dependencies
4 Evaluate individual attack scenario by means of its effect,
gain and modes
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